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Policy Research Working Paper 5418
This paper investigates the effectiveness of post-conflict 
aid at the project level and aims to identify post-conflict 
situations as a window of opportunity for project success. 
The Independent Evaluation Group dataset provides 
extensive information on the characteristics of World 
Bank projects including an independent rating of their 
success, supervision and evaluation quality. The paper 
estimates the probability of success of aid projects 
depending on the characteristics of the intervention 
and looks for possible special patterns in post civil 
war situations. The results suggest that the probability 
of success of World Bank projects increases as peace 
This paper—a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to understand how interventions can best contribute to poverty reduction. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mduponchel@
worldbank.org.
lasts. Supervision appears to be a crucial determinant 
of the success of projects, especially during the first 
years of peace. Although the results of the sector-level 
analysis need to be taken with caution, the authors 
find that projects in the transport sector and in the 
urban development sector appear more successful in 
post-conflict environments. On the contrary, education 
projects seem less successful and therefore need to be 
highly supervised. Projects in the private sector should 
wait as they face a higher probability of failure in the first 
years of peace.What explains aid project success in post-conﬂict situations?
Lisa Chauvet∗ , Paul Collier†and Marguerite Duponchel‡§
∗IRD, DIAL
†University of Oxford, CSAE
‡The World Bank
§We are grateful to Jean-Claude Berth´ el´ emy, Fabrizio Coricelli and Eliana La Ferrara for useful comments. We also
thank participants to the CSAE conference (2009) and to the UNU-WIDER conference Africa: myths and realities in
Accra (2009). This paper constituted a chapter of Marguerite’s PhD thesis (University Paris 1 Panth´ eon-Sorbonne,
CES). The usual disclaimers apply.
11 Introduction
This paper explores aid eﬀectiveness in post-conﬂict situations using project-level data. Post-conﬂict
situations are characterized by economic opportunities for recovery and political opportunities for
reform and change (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Chauvet and Collier, 2006; Collier, 2007). The op-
portunities provided by the need to rebuild the economy in post-conﬂict situations should tend to
make aid particularly eﬀective in the ﬁrst post-war decade. However, this may be oﬀset by the limits
to absorptive capacity due to particularly diﬃcult economic and administrative environments. To
date the limited quantitative evidence on aid eﬀectiveness post-conﬂict has come from macroeconomic
studies. These suggest that from the perspective of aid eﬀectiveness, the former eﬀect predominates.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) ﬁnd that during the ﬁrst few years of peace the absorptive capacity of aid
is about double its usual level. Elbadawi et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the appreciation of the real exchange
rate induced by aid is much weaker in post-conﬂict situations, making aid more eﬀective than normal.
Adam et al. (2008) show that post-conﬂict aid is used to reduce inﬂation by reigning in the deﬁcit
ﬁnancing typical during conﬂict. Duponchel (2008) ﬁnds that aid stabilizes the post-conﬂict environ-
ment, although she ﬁnds limits to absorption: the optimum amount of aid is around 4.8 percent of
GDP, around double the average observed in her sample.
This is the ﬁrst quantitative study of aid eﬀectiveness post-conﬂict to use project-level data. We use
information on the success or failure of World Bank projects and investigate whether performance is
systematically diﬀerent in post-conﬂict situations. We also investigate whether post-conﬂict situations
need particular sector targeting, enhanced supervision eﬀort or special sequencing of project launching.
World Bank projects are assessed by an independent institution, the IEG (Independent Evaluation
Group). The IEG has provided the evaluation of all World Bank projects worldwide since the 1960s.
Along with its assessment, this database provides information on the characteristics of each project
(investment versus budget support; IDA or IBRD projects, ﬁnancial conditions, NGOs involved, etc.)
and on the supervision and preparation eﬀorts of World Bank staﬀ. Although it has not previously
been used to investigate post-conﬂict situations, it is a standard database for the study of aid eﬀec-
tiveness. Using it, Isham and Kaufmann (1999), Dollar and Svensson (2000), Kilby (2000), Dollar
and Levin (2005) and Chauvet et al. (2006) analyze the respective importance of donors’ eﬀort and
recipients’ macro-economic and institutional characteristics for the success of World Bank projects.
From this literature no consensus has emerged as to whether the success or failure of World Bank
projects primarily depends upon countries’ political economy or on project characteristics, notably the
supervision of projects. In a slightly diﬀerent framework, Guillaumont and Laajaj (2006) also explore
2the determinants of the success of World Bank projects. They ﬁnd that the success rate of projects is
negatively aﬀected by external factors such as vulnerability to external shocks. They also show that
aid dampens the negative impact of shocks on the probability of success of World Bank projects. With
the exception of Guillaumont and Laajaj (2006) who ﬁnd a negative impact of being at war during
the project, none of the papers using the IEG database has taken into account the history of conﬂict
as a factor for the success of a project.
In Sections 2 and 3, we present the data on World Bank projects and some descriptive statistics
on aid projects in post-conﬂict situations as well as the econometric model. In Section 4, we explore
whether projects in post-conﬂict countries are likely to be more or less successful than in other devel-
oping countries. We particularly investigate the timing of projects with respect to the end of wars,
and try to identify when during post-conﬂict should projects be launched in order to maximize the
chances that they succeed. We also explore whether post-conﬂict situations call for a special sectoral
targeting of aid projects. Finally, our main results are summarized in Section 5.
2 Data
The World Bank undertakes development projects in most developing countries. It generally does not
implement projects, relying on partners on the ground. The cycle of each project consists of several
phases. First, the implementation phase is dedicated to reaching an agreement with the recipient gov-
ernment on both the content and the design of the project. Once approved by the Board, the project
enters its implementation phase which is undertaken by the government. The implementation is itself
divided into diﬀerent funding phases, whose frequency and scale is determined during the prepara-
tion phase. Each tranche is released, aborted or scaled down by the World Bank depending on the
conclusions of the supervision report. The eﬀort put into supervision is decided by the World Bank
management. Country Directors allocate funds, including for supervision, from an overall country
budget dedicated to diﬀerent activities. Once completed or aborted, the project is evaluated by the
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) after two years.
IEG was established in 1973 as an independent unit within the World Bank Group. Former Presi-
dent McNamara stated on the thirtieth birthday of IEG: ‘We set up OED [ now IEG ] with professional
people, well qualiﬁed to examine the activities of their peers and their colleagues at the World Bank,
but with no line of authority from me or anyone under me to direct them in whatever they say’ (OED,
2003). It was originally designed to assess the eﬀectiveness of projects, how projects are run by bor-
3rowers as well as the long term impact of projects on the country’s development process. The IEG
reports directly to the Board and, in principle, its staﬀ are not permitted to move to positions in other
parts of the Bank.
The IEG database covers projects started from 1961 to 2002. During this period, over 6,400
projects have been evaluated in all sectors and most countries. The outcomes of those projects are
rated independently. Three factors are considered: (i) the relevance of the interventions objectives in
regard of the country needs and institutional priorities; (ii) the extent to which the objectives have
been achieved; and (iii) the eﬃciency of the project, which is the extent to which the objectives have
been achieved without using more resources than necessary. Based on the scores, the outcome of the
project is rated from 0 (highly unsatisfactory) to 5 (highly satisfactory).1 As mentioned earlier we
deﬁne success = 1 for projects rated as satisfactory or very satisfactory. Overall, 58 percent of the
projects were considered successful and 3 percent very successful. IEG also separately evaluates the
supervision eﬀort by the World Bank and the preparation eﬀort by the recipient government from
highly unsatisfactory (1) to highly satisfactory (4).
We acknowledge that the quality of the data is not ideal and that working on project performance
in post-conﬂict is diﬃcult. There are known major weaknesses with World Bank project evaluation.
Indeed, IEG evaluation are not randomized control experiments as evaluation would stand for in the
economic literature but rather, evaluation is an internal process that consists in qualitative assessments
relative to stated objectives. Consequently, it is likely that projects in post-conﬂict environment would
imply lower expectations. The very same project implemented in Burundi may have lower objectives
than when undertaken in Ghana. The data might well suﬀer from a potential bias that would aﬀect
the ratings of success but also of the quality of supervision and preparation. Having said that, the
evaluation procedure is independent, staﬀ are experienced, the process has been on-going for more
than three decades, and a lot of resources are put into it. It is therefore unlikely that the data have no
informative content whatsoever. In addition, the bias, at least for its larger part, seems to conﬁrm the
diﬃculties associated with implementing projects in post-conﬁct environment. Indeed, results show
that the coeﬃcient for post-conﬂict projects is always signiﬁcant and negative when it should be bi-
ased upwards, conﬁrming that post-conﬂict makes indeed things harder. Regarding preparation and
supervision, it is likely that the diﬃcult environment of implementation calls for larger eﬀorts. As a
result, the same eﬀorts of preparing and supervising might be less well rated in post-conﬂict than in a
country at peace. If this is the reality, coeﬃcients would be biased downwards. However the analysis
1Very unsuccessful: 0; unsuccessful: 1; moderately unsuccessful: 2; moderately successful: 3; successful: 4; highly
successful: 5.
4underlines a positive and signiﬁcant association between preparation, supervision and post-conﬂict
projects. Again, our analysis seems to be a lower bound.
The IEG data provide information on the outcome of the project, but also on the characteristics of
the project. The characteristics of project j, Pj, do not vary overtime. They include the main sectors
of intervention, whether the project is an IDA or an IBRD project, whether it is an investment project
or not, as well as the quality of preparation and the supervision eﬀorts assessed by IEG.2 All projects
considered in the analysis have been evaluated and therefore have been closed. We deliberately used
the original closing date of the project to deﬁne its duration in order to avoid potential endogeneity
linked to the revised closing date vis-` a-vis the success of the project. Projects started during war
are dropped from our sample. Indeed, we want to distinguish post-conﬂict projects from projects in
countries at peace.
In order to deﬁne the civil war episodes, we used the PRIO version 4-2007 database and chose the
high intensity criterion deﬁned as at least 1,000 war related deaths per year.3 This, of course, inevitably
leads us to diﬀerent results than if we used a lower level of casualties. Indeed, wars are shorter using
this deﬁnition and our database includes more post-conﬂict episodes and relapses to civil war than if we
used a total of 1,000 deaths for the conﬂict as a threshold. It also implies that the country reported as
being in a post-conﬂict period or at peace, for example in the few years preceding the collapse into war,
may have been considered at war using a lower intensity criteria, thus impacting on the results. How-
ever, the high intensity criterion allows deﬁning clear episodes when a lower threshold could have led to
unclear dating and would potentially be biased towards the level of information available on casualties.
Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on the database of projects we used and the his-
tory of war of the countries.
Table 2 presents the evolution of the rate of success depending on time and the history of conﬂict
(ﬁrst column). The rate of success does not vary widely depending on the environment of imple-
mentation: projects in countries at war, in post-conﬂict and at peace seem to have around the same
chance of being successful. Interestingly, we remark that the rate of success of projects did some-
what decrease over time: only 52 percent of the projects were rated as successful or very successful
in the 1990s while 87 percent of the projects were rated as successful in the 1960s, 73 percent in the
1970s and 54 percent in the 1980s. This apparent drop in the rate of success in the 1980s and 1990s
2Variables are presented in detail in Table 5.
3The list of wars is presented in Table 6.
5Table 1: Descriptive statistics on projects and conﬂict
Number of World Bank projects evaluated 6,404
Projects started in countries at peace 79%
The country was always at peace 65%
The project was implemented before the outbreak of the war or after the post conﬂict period 35%
Projects started in a country at war 7%
Peace is settled during the project 70%
War resumes during the project once peace is settled 3%
Projects started in a post-conﬂict country 14%
War resumes during the project 25%
Source: authors’ calculations using PRIO database on conﬂicts and IEG database on WB projects.
might be linked to the gradual institutionalisation of evaluation started in the mid-1970s (OED, 2003).
3 Econometric model
We estimate the probability that World Bank projects will be successful depending on a set of projects
(Pj) and country characteristics (Cj,i), but also on factors relating to the history of civil war of coun-
tries (Warj,i), where j (j = 1J) denotes projects and i (i = 1I) denotes countries.
We estimate the probability of success of World Bank projects and explore whether projects in
post-conﬂict situations follow a diﬀerent pattern. To do so, we estimate a model of the following form:
Success∗
j,i = β0Pj + γ0Cj,i + θ0Warj,i + εj,i (1)
where Successj,i =





We consider that Successj,i equals 1 whenever the outcome of World Bank projects is assessed by
the IEG as successful or very successful.
Cj,i is a set of characteristics of country i averaged over [t; t-3] where t is the starting date of
project j. Hence, for a project that started in 2000, each country variable, Cj,i, is calculated over
the period 1997-2000. This way of controlling for country characteristics means that for two projects









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7the project was launched. Cj,i includes the growth rate, which is expected to positively inﬂuence the
probability of success of the project, as well as per capita GDP level. We also control for the size of the
country (population) and the political, ﬁnancial and economic risk as measured by the International
Country Risk Guide4; a project implemented in a more stable environment is expected to have more
chance of being successful.
Finally, Warj,i, is a set of variables related to the history of the conﬂict in country i. Of course the
history of conﬂict varies according to the time period and again, two projects occurring in the same
country but in diﬀerent decades may end up with quite diﬀerent conﬂict history.
As the idea of the paper is to analyze the success of projects more speciﬁcally in post-conﬂict
environment, it is all the more necessary to understand and best catch the history of the war vis-` a-vis
the project. Figure 1 illustrates the method of reasoning. From this tree we derived the set of Warj,i
variables.
The ﬁrst step, at the country history level, was to distinguish between the countries that have al-
ways been at peace since 1945, like Ghana or Tunisia, and countries that have suﬀered from a civil war
or multiple episodes of war such as Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The dummy
variable AT PEACE is equal to one for the countries that never had a civil war.
The second step consists in focusing on the starting date of the project: Was the country at war
or in post-conﬂict? This leads us to deﬁne two diﬀerent variables: INIT WAR is equal to one for
countries that were at war when the project started. Symmetrically, INIT PC is a dummy which is
equal to one when the country was in post-conﬂict when the project started. We deﬁne post-conﬂict
as the 15 years which follows the onset of peace.
The third step focuses on the project period. If the country was at war at the beginning of the
project, it is necessary to indicate whether the war lasted for the duration of the project or whether
peace was settled during the project. We create a dummy variable, WAR PROJECT which is equal
to one if the country was at war during the entire project. On the contrary, if war ended during the
project, a dummy RETURN PEACE is equal to one.
4The ICRG is a methodology developed by Political Risks Services. The rating comprises 22 variables in three
categories: political, ﬁnancial and economic each divided in series of risk components. The ﬁnal composite index is
a sum of all those risks that ranges from 0 to 100. This index was preferred to the Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment which is computed by the World Bank and therefore might raise endogeneity issues.
8Similarly, if the country was in a post-conﬂict phase at the beginning of the project and that the
peace lasted during the whole project, a dummy PC PROJECT is equal to one. If war resumed while
the project had already started, a dummy RETURN WAR is equal to one.
The ﬁnal step investigates the timing of the project vis--vis the conﬂict or the peace. We generate
a variable, PC DURATION, which counts the number of years of post-conﬂict peace when the project
started. This variable is central to the forthcoming analysis.
Interestingly, the sector repartition is relatively similar whether the country is at peace, at war or
in post-conﬂict at the beginning of the project, with around a quarter of the projects implemented in
the rural sector and around 10 to 15 percent in the energy and mining sector. Looking in more details
at the evolution of projects overtime, diﬀerences in sectors of intervention depending on whether the
country is at peace, in post-conﬂict or at war are not striking. Yet we observe a switch away from the
rural sector in the 1990s.
4 Results
We estimate Equation (1) using a probit. We focus the analysis on projects in post-conﬂict and peace
environments (highlighted in red in Figure 1). We drop the projects implemented in war zones (7
percent of the projects, cf. Table 1 and Figure 1). Our sample is reduced by the introduction of some
of the control variables for country characteristics. From more than 6,000 projects, we end up with
2,394 projects, covering the period 1977-2002. Around 55 percent of these projects (1,324 projects)
were implemented in countries always at peace, 26 percent (639 projects) in countries at peace at the
start of the project, but which had at least one episode of civil war during 1977-2002. Finally, 18
percent of these projects (431 projects) were implemented in post-conﬂict environments.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we explore whether the probability of success is diﬀerent
in post-conﬂict situations than in countries at peace. We then ask when during the post-conﬂict period
projects should be started so that they have the greatest chance of success. We also explore whether
post-conﬂict situations call for improved supervision and preparation. Finally, the sectoral sequence













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































104.1 Are post-conﬂict projects more successful than others?
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 includes all our control variables and is run on the whole sample of World
Bank projects, excluding projects in war-torn countries. We use an ordered probit model using the
IEG success rating from 0 to 5. The use of an ordered probit enables to not lose the information
contained in the discrete variable. However, interpretation of the results is a lot less intuitive than
for a probit, which is therefore preferred. Table 10 reports the marginal eﬀects from regression (1)
for each outcome value. Coeﬃcients change signs between the project being moderately successful and
successful thus conﬁrming the appropriateness of our binary variable deﬁnition. Column (2) shows
the results of the probit model. The signs and the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients are not aﬀected by
the change of model. The sample includes projects started in a post-conﬂict environment and during
which the war broke out again. Introducing a dummy variable for a potential return to war shows
that these projects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the rest of the projects in the sample (Table 9,
column (1)). Decade, region, as well as sector dummy variables are introduced in all the regressions
of Table 3, their coeﬃcients are not reported. The standard errors are also clustered by country.
Column (2) includes the ICRG index as a control. The coeﬃcient is negative, as expected, but not
signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the introduction of the ICRG in the regression leads to a signiﬁcant loss of
observations. Indeed, the ICRG is only available since 1984. For this reason, we decide to drop it from
the regression. Column (3) reports the results of the basis analysis.
The results suggest that the longer the project, the smaller the chance of success. On the con-
trary, better preparation and supervision signiﬁcantly increase the probability of success of World
Bank projects. Yet the impact of the supervision quality is greater than the one of the preparation.5
Investments are nine percent more likely to be successful while IDA projects have an eleven percent
higher probability to be successful than IBRD projects.
Regarding country-level characteristics, income growth and GDP per capita scores are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Both increase the chances that World Bank projects will succeed, suggesting that
higher level of development, combined with economic growth are favorable to aid projects.6
In the fourth column of Table 3, we introduced interaction terms between INIT PC and the project
characteristics. This enables a ﬁrst step of comparison between post-conﬂict and peace environments.
5We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of preparation and supervision are diﬀerent (p-value = 0.016).
6We also introduced the ratio of aid over GDP as well as the dependency on fuel exports. Both had no impact on
the probability of success of the project. We thus decided to drop them from the regression as they led to a loss of
observations, see Table (9) column (2). Note that aid/GDP is signiﬁcant but only at 10 percent
11Unsurprisingly, the coeﬃcient of INIT PC is negative, large and signiﬁcant, implying that projects
started in a post-conﬂict environment have lower chances of success than projects implemented in
countries at peace. The coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are not signiﬁcant, apart from preparation
and supervision. Hence, the duration of the project, whether it is an investment and whether it is
an IDA project all have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability of success but this impact does not
diﬀer in post-conﬂict countries than in countries at peace. Nevertheless, the quality of both prepara-
tion and supervision have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of success. In fact, good
preparation and supervision can oﬀset the negative eﬀect of implementing a project in a post-conﬂict
environment.
4.2 When during post-conﬂict is it best to start a project?
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 push further the analysis of post-conﬂict projects. They examine when,
during the post-conﬂict period, aid projects have the highest chance of success. To do so, we include
PC DURATION, which measures the number of years, at the starting date of the project, since peace
onset. We also include its square to capture possible non-linear relationships between the probability
of success and the time elapsed since the onset of peace. Of course, we also need to distinguish between
post-conﬂict countries and countries at peace: INIT PC captures whether the project was started in
a country at peace or in a post-conﬂict situation.
We also introduce the post-conﬂict variables interacted with the quality of supervision in order to
capture a potential diﬀerent eﬀect of supervision on the success of post-conﬂict projects. Preparation
does not have a special eﬀect in post-conﬂict. Interaction terms of preparation with INIT PC and
PC DURATION were also introduced in the regression but we dropped them as their coeﬃcients were
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Preparation is important for the success of projects. Whether
it is set in a post-conﬂict environment however does not increase or decrease the beneﬁts of good
preparation, once we control for timing. The impact stays the same (Table 9, column (3)).
On the contrary, the quality of supervision has a distinctive impact on the success of projects in
post-conﬂict countries. The coeﬃcient of INIT PC x supervision is large and positive. As mentioned
above, good quality supervision which is a proxy for implementing capacity does quickly oﬀset the
direct negative impact of starting a project in post-conﬂict. Being in a post-conﬂict environment at
the time when the project starts (INIT PC) is signiﬁcant at 1 percent, with a negative coeﬃcient.
This negative eﬀect is compensated by the higher impact of the quality of supervision in post-conﬂict
12Table 3: Success of project depending on post-conﬂict situations (marginal eﬀects)
Oprobit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Project characteristics
Duration -0.076 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027
(0.022)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Investment=1 0.293 0.101 0.095 0.092 0.098 0.096
(0.107)*** (0.055)* (0.049)** (0.054)* (0.048)** (0.048)**
IDA=1 0.241 0.136 0.114 0.110 0.120 0.121
(0.068)*** (0.036)*** (0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.036)*** (0.037)***
Preparation (1-4) 1.030 0.444 0.387 0.356 0.384 0.384
(0.078)*** (0.041)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)***
Supervision (1-4) 1.007 0.462 0.477 0.464 0.467 0.460
(0.058)*** (0.035)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)***
Country characteristics
GDP Growth, (t-3;t) 0.036 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.012)*** (0.006)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Ln GDP per cap, (t-3;t) 0.129 0.089 0.063 0.069 0.069 0.069
(0.048)*** (0.024)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)***
Ln population, (t-3;t) 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.026) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ICRG, (t-3;t) -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.003)
Conﬂict history
INIT PC -0.665 -0.656 -0.798
(0.082)*** (0.103)*** (0.190)***
INIT PC x Duration -0.004
(0.023)
INIT PC x Investment 0.034
(0.109)
INIT PC x IDA 0.079
(0.073)
INIT PC x Preparation 0.212
(0.069)***
INIT PC x Supervision 0.119 0.374 0.593
(0.069)* (0.105)*** (0.486)





PC Duration x Supervision -0.088 -0.095
(0.030)*** (0.106)
PC Duration







Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jointly signiﬁcant test (Chi2) 0.000 0.191
Threshold in years (supervision=2.8) 11.5
Pseudo R
2 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30
ll -2047.308 -866.636 -1202.669 -1196.901 -1197.236 -1199.259
Observations 1830 1828 2464 2464 2464 2464
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at (*) 10%, at (**) 5%, at (***) 1% 13environment, as captured by the interaction term of INIT PC and supervision. At the average super-
vision quality index (=2.8), a project started in post-conﬂict has a 39 percent higher chance of success
than a project started in a peaceful country, without introducing the eﬀect of time since peace onset.
Column (5) of Table 3 also includes information as to when during the post-conﬂict period the
projects have a higher chance of success. The variable PC DURATION, its square, and their interac-
tions with supervision suggest that the relationship between time since peace onset and the probability
of success is non-linear and depends on the quality of supervision.
Taking supervision at its mean (=2.8), Figure 2 shows that the probability of success is higher in
post-conﬂict environments than in peaceful environments during the ﬁrst 4 to 5 years. The marginal
impact of time since peace onset is negative, though, until the 12th year of peace (as suggested by
the negative slope of the blue line until the 12th year). However, for very low values of supervision,
projects in both peaceful and post-conﬂict situations have a very low probability of success. For very
high values of supervision, the probability of success is very high, and there is almost no diﬀerence
between post-conﬂict and peaceful countries, although again, the diﬀerence between the two red curves
indicates a slightly higher probability of the project being successful in post-conﬂict environments.
The absorptive capacity in post-conﬂict seems to be conditional to the capacity to implement
projects. Supervision is a good proxy for implementing capacity. It is implementation rather than
design that matters for the success of projects in post-war environment. This conclusion is veriﬁed
at the national level. Collier and Duponchel (2010) analyze the economic legacy of war on ﬁrms us-
ing data collected in Sierra Leone. They ﬁnd that the main consequence of civil war on ﬁrms is a
severe lack of skills. To increase the chances of success of projects this shortage needs to be ﬁlled.
The eﬀect of supervision decreases overtime following a U-shaped trend as illustrated by Figure 3.
Arguably, national skills slowly recover a decent level as peace is maintained; hence, the additional
beneﬁts associated with the quality of supervision fade as time goes on and as peace lasts. According
to Figure 3, by the 5th year since the peace-onset, the impact of supervision reaches the same level as
in environments at peace. This could be explained by the supra-normal growth in the second phase
of post-conﬂict (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004) that creates a more secure environment for projects. Thus
supervision might be less important for success during this phase of boom in the post-conﬂict economy.
In column (6) we calculate the time since peace onset taking as a reference the middle date of
the projects. In doing so, we give each year the same weight. Previously, while using the time since






















































































15The coeﬃcients lose signiﬁcance conﬁrming that implementing capacity matters especially at the be-
ginning of the project. For the projects started in the ﬁrst few years of peace, it is essential to have an
excellent supervision. The earlier the project starts, the higher the impact of the quality of supervision.
Figure 3: Impact of the quality of supervision on the probability of success
4.3 Are some sectors more promising in post-conﬂict?
Introducing sector dummies interacted with the post-conﬂict characteristics allows investigating whether
the probability of the project being successful is peculiar in post-conﬂict environment depending on the
sector of intervention. In other words, is there some kind of diﬀerent sectoral targeting in post-conﬂict
situations? In Table 4, we investigate whether projects are more likely to succeed in some sectors rather
than in others in post-conﬂict situations. Table 9 reports the results when none of the sector variables
are signiﬁcant. As we only have access to cross-sectional information and not information generated by
a sequence of things within a particular country, we purposely avoid making strong statements about
sector sequence.
Starting from our baseline regression (regression (5) of Table 3), we introduce a dummy for each
16Table 4: Probability of success in post-conﬂict by sector
Educ. Energy/Min. Transport Private Urban dvpt Soc. protec.
Project characteristics
Duration -0.030 -0.029 -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.026
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Investment=1 0.137 0.145 0.122 0.133 0.134 0.127
(0.043)*** (0.042)*** (0.044)*** (0.042)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)***
IDA=1 0.115 0.112 0.129 0.117 0.120 0.114
(0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.035)***
Preparation (1-4) 0.384 0.383 0.379 0.384 0.383 0.383
(0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)***
Supervision (1-4) 0.473 0.474 0.470 0.473 0.474 0.472
(0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)***
Country characteristics
GDP Growth, (t-3;t) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Ln GDP per cap, (t-3;t) 0.065 0.067 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.071
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)***
Ln population, (t-3;t) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Conﬂict history
INIT PC -0.662 -0.663 -0.665 -0.682 -0.683 -0.668
(0.109)*** (0.106)*** (0.104)*** (0.094)*** (0.075)*** (0.101)***
PC Duration 0.216 0.212 0.239 0.229 0.226 0.212
(0.099)** (0.103)** (0.097)** (0.097)** (0.086)*** (0.093)**
PC Duration
2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(0.008)* (0.008) (0.008)* (0.008)* (0.007)* (0.007)*
INIT PC x Supervision 0.380 0.389 0.381 0.394 0.393 0.384
(0.114)*** (0.117)*** (0.114)*** (0.112)*** (0.093)*** (0.109)***
PC Duration x Supervision -0.084 -0.084 -0.094 -0.087 -0.086 -0.084
(0.031)*** (0.034)** (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.028)*** (0.030)***
PC Duration
2 x Supervision 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Sector characteristics
Sector 0.089 -0.025 0.098 0.083 0.005 0.149
(0.050) * (0.042) (0.057)* (0.077) (0.069) (0.077)*
INIT PC x Sector -0.037 -0.203 -0.038 0.474 0.265 -0.245
(0.144) (0.108)* (0.196) (0.014)*** (0.116)** (0.408)
PC Duration x Sector -0.038 0.012 0.079 -0.657 -0.035 0.121
(0.049) (0.037) (0.096) (0.211)*** (0.053) (0.235)
PC Duration
2 x Sector 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 0.099 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.040)** (0.004) (0.022)
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jointly signiﬁcant test, Chi2
(Conﬂict variables*Sector)
0.061 0.205 0.010 0.000 0.233 0.000
Pseudo R
2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
ll -1213.363 -1213.527 -1205.504 -1212.415 -1214.183 -1211.455
No. of ﬁrms in sector i 214 385 261 79 132 76
Observations 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at (*) 10%, at (**) 5%, at (***) 1%
17sector, as well as a sector dummy interacted with INIT PC and PC DURATION. The results underline
that projects in the education sector are always more successful than projects in other sectors (column
1). Nevertheless, they seem less likely to be successful compared to projects in other sectors in post-
conﬂict settings. Yet the coeﬃcient of the interacted terms INIT PC x sector is only signiﬁcant at 10
percent. Projects in the urban development sector (column 5) have a signiﬁcantly lower probability to
fail in post-conﬂict ceteris paribus. In fact, they have a 26.5 percent higher chance of being successful
compared to projects in other sectors. This can be potentially explained by the fact that war lead to
the destruction of infrastructure which needs to be rebuilt once peace has been restored. Moreover,
war often induces massive movements of people, from rural areas to cities in the country, and outside
of the countries. Refugees are potentially more inclined to move to cities upon return, consequently
raising the needs for development in urban areas. The opposite applies for projects in the energy and
mining sectors (column 2). Those projects are signiﬁcantly less successful in post-conﬂict environments
(by 10 percent) than projects in other sectors. One explanation might be that checks and balances
need to be restored for projects in this sector to succeed fully.
Column (1) suggests that projects targeting education have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to
succeed ceteris paribus. Although the coeﬃcients of the interacted terms are not signiﬁcant individu-
ally, they are together. As a result, education projects have a higher probability to fail in post-conﬂict
countries especially when peace was just settled (see Figure 4). Hence, if you look at the curve projects
in education should wait a few years; however there is a clear need for knowledge to be rebuilt in im-
mediate post-conﬂict environment. Indeed, as shown by Collier and Duponchel (2010)’s research on
Sierra Leone, one of the persistent consequences of war at the ﬁrm level is the loss of skills. Moreover,
war very often leads to the removal from school of a large number of children, either because classes
are closed, they are required to work for the subsistence of the family as resources become scarce,
they are forced to ﬂee or in the extreme cases, children are enrolled to ﬁght. In all cases, education of
children suﬀers during war time. Education should therefore be among priorities. Extra supervision
of the projects might be needed to increase the chances of success.
The probability of success in the transport sector is higher than in all sectors. In post-conﬂict
environment, it however follows a U-inversed shaped path (column 3). Indeed, Figure 4 shows that
the probability of success increases once peace is settled and then decreases after a few years. The
reason behind can surely be linked, like projects in the urban development sector, to the destruction
of infrastructure. Roads and transport systems are undeniably badly hit by warfare and should be
rebuilt as soon as possible in order to restore exchanges. As the absorption capacity is greater in the
sector, transport projects are more successful ceteris paribus.
18On the contrary, projects targeting the private sector face a higher probability of failure than
projects in other sectors in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after the end of the civil war (column 4). It however
follows a U shaped path and by the ﬁfth year, private sector projects are more successful than others.
The immediate aftermath of war is not the most favourable environment for business prosperity, which
might well explain the lower probability of success. A good example is the destruction of transport
infrastructure which are essential for business activities, especially those dealing with tradable goods.
Finally, the probability of success of a social protection project increases over time since the peace
onset passes. Social protection is deﬁned by the World Bank as policies to alleviate poverty and pro-
mote equitable growth via expending opportunities, providing security and enhancing equity.7 As the
situation in the country improves together with the quality of institutions, projects enhancing social
protection become more likely than others to succeed, as rated by IEG. The complete breakdown of
social services during conﬂict leads to a great need for intervention once peace is settled. As time goes
on and the country gradually recovers, the conditions for the success of those projects ameliorate.
Figure 4 below illustrates the evolution of the probability of success of projects when it varies over
time.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the determinants of the success of World Bank projects in post-conﬂict sit-
uations. Our econometric analysis suggests that being a post-conﬂict country at the time when the
project starts increases the probability that the project will succeed. But gradually the positive impact
of being in a post-conﬂict situation on the chance of success fades.
Supervision of projects seems to be crucial for their success, even more in post-conﬂict situations.
If supervision is not satisfactory enough, being a post-conﬂict country may have an adverse impact on
the success of projects, even in the ﬁrst years of peace. A good implementation capacity is essential
for the success of post-conﬂict projects. Indeed, war results in the destruction of skills. World Bank
staﬀ need to accompany their projects with the technical assistance required.
Post-conﬂict situations also call for a distinctive sectoral intervention. Projects targeting urban de-
7www.worldbank.org.
19Figure 4: Impact on probability of success of time since peace onset: education, transport, private
sector and social protection sector
velopment and in the transport sector seem to be more successful in post-conﬂict environments ceteris
paribus. In fact, for transport projects, the probability of success signiﬁcantly rises as time since peace
onset increases. In both cases, this can be explained by the necessity to reconstruct destroyed infras-
tructure for the economy to recover. Projects in the private sector need to be implemented after the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of peace for the chances of success to be higher than projects targeting other sectors,
underlining the potentially hostile environment for business in the early years of peace. Education
projects face a higher probability of failure in post-conﬂict environments, but should however not be
excluded from the recovery process. However, those should be closely supervised to oﬀset the negative
impact. Finally, we observe that the probability of success of social protection projects rises over time
as peace is sustained.
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21Table 5: Deﬁnition of variables
Variable Name Description
Project Duration Duration of the project (source: IEG)
Investment Binary variable equal to 1 if the project is an investment
(source: IEG)
IDA Binary variable equal to 1 if the project is ﬁnanced by
IDA (source: IEG)
Preparation Quality of the preparation from WB staﬀ as rated by
IEG from 1 to 4 (source: IEG)
Supervision Quality of the supervision from WB staﬀ as rated by IEG
from 1 to 4 (source: IEG)
Environment GDP Growth, t- t-3 Average growth rate of GDP during the 3 years preceding
the implementation of the project
Ln GDP per capita, t- t-3 Average of the logarithms of the level of GDP per capita
during the 3 years preceding the implementation of the
project (source: WDI)
Ln population, t- t-3 Average of the logarithms of the size of the country pop-
ulation over the 3 years preceding the implementation of
the project (source: WDI)
ICRG, t- t-3 Average of the International Country Risk Guide over
the 3 year preceding the implementation of the project
(source: Political Risk Services)
22Table 6: List of Civil Wars (Prio v04-2007)
Deﬁnition of civil war: high intensity, internal and internationalized internal conﬂict
Afghanistan: 1978-2001, 2005-2006 Laos: 1959-1961,1963-1973
Algeria: 1993-2001 Lebanon: 1958, 1976, 1980-1982
Morocco: 1975-1980 Liberia:1990, 1992, 2003
Angola: 1974-1994, 1998-2001 Mozambique: 1981-1992
Argentina: 1975 Myanmar: 1948-1953, 1961-1978, 1992, 1994
Azerbaijan: 1992-1994 Nepal: 2002-2005
Burundi: 1998, 2000-2002 Nicaragua: 1978-1979, 1983-1988
Cambodia: 1967,1970-1975,1978, 1989 Nigeria: 1967-1970
Cameroon: 1960 Pakistan: 1971, 1974
Chad: 1965-1988, 1990, 2006 Paraguay: 1947
China: 1946-1949,1956,1959 Peru 1981-1985, 1988-1993
Colombia: 2001-2002, 2004-2005 Philippines: 1946-1954, 1978, 1981-1986, 1989, 1991-1992, 2000
Congo: 1997-1998 Republic of Korea: 1948-1950
Costa Rica: 1948 Russia∗: 1946-1948, 1995-1996, 1999-2001, 2004
Croatian Republic of Bosnia∗: 1992-1993 Rwanda: 1991-1992, 1998, 2001
Cuba: 1958 Sierra Leone: 1998-1999
DRC: 1964-1965,1997-2000 Somalia: 1990-1992
El Salvador: 1981-1990 South Africa: 1980-1983, 1986-1988
Ethiopia: 1974-1991 Sri Lanka: 1971, 1989-2001, 2006
Georgia: 1993 Sudan: 1963-1972, 1983-1992, 1995-2004, 2006
Greece: 1946-1949 Syria: 1982
Guatemala: 1967-1981 Tajikistan: 1992-1993
Guinea Bissau: 1998 Turkey: 1992-1997
Hyberdad: 1947-1948∗ Uganda: 1979, 1981-1989, 1991, 2002, 2004
India: 1948-1951,1988-1993, 1998-2005 Vietnam: 1955-1964
Indonesia: 1950, 1953, 1975-1978, 1990 Yemen (AR)∗: 1948, 1962-1964, 1966-1967, 1994
Iran: 1980-1988 Yugoslavia (Serbia)∗: 1991, 1998-1999
Iraq: 1961-1966, 1969, 1974-1975, 1988, 1991, 2004-2006 Zimbabwe: 1976-1979
∗Hyberdad was not included in the dataset. The Balkan countries are dropped at a later stage due to matching
problems with national information as a result of the numerous secessions. Russia is only included after the fall of the
USSR. The Yemenite wars are only reported once the North and the South have reuniﬁed in order to match the
macro-economic data.
The country is considered post conﬂict starting on the ﬁrst year of full peace and exit on the 1st full year of war i.e.
the year when war resumes is still considered as post conﬂict.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of projects
Variable Nb of observations Mean Diﬀ. between PC and peace projects
Duration 6404 4.67 0.10
∗
Dummy Investment=1 6397 0.90 -0.01
Dummy IDA=1 6404 0.43 -0.00
Preparation 2853 2.85 -0.01
Supervision 3913 2.81 0.00
∗: Diﬀerence signiﬁcant at 10
23Table 8: Probability of success in post-conﬂict by sector (2), marginal eﬀects
Econ Pol Health Financial Rural Govce Water Env.
Project characteristics
Duration -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.026 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Investment=1 0.125 0.141 0.134 0.137 0.138 0.140 0.143
(0.049)** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.042)***
IDA=1 0.118 0.121 0.118 0.126 0.119 0.118 0.119
(0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.034)***
Preparation (1-4) 0.382 0.384 0.384 0.382 0.384 0.384 0.382
(0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)***
Supervision (1-4) 0.475 0.474 0.473 0.474 0.472 0.474 0.474
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)***
Environment characteristics
GDP Growth, (t-3;t) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Ln GDP per cap, (t-3;t) 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.071 0.067 0.067 0.068
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)***
Ln population, (t-3;t) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Conﬂict history
INIT PC -0.662 -0.671 -0.667 -0.671 -0.671 -0.668 -0.663
(0.101)*** (0.091)*** (0.102)*** (0.105)*** (0.097)*** (0.098)*** (0.101)***
PC Duration 0.217 0.248 0.217 0.243 0.220 0.213 0.212
(0.092)** (0.098)** (0.096)** (0.098)** (0.092)** (0.092)** (0.092)**
PC Duration2 -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.007)* (0.008)** (0.008)* (0.008)** (0.007)* (0.008)* (0.007)*
INIT PC x Supervision 0.379 0.386 0.382 0.383 0.393 0.391 0.376
(0.106)*** (0.103)*** (0.111)*** (0.110)*** (0.110)*** (0.107)*** (0.107)***
PC Duration x Supervision -0.086 -0.093 -0.085 -0.090 -0.088 -0.084 -0.082
(0.029)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)***
PC Duration2 x Supervision 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.002)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Sector characteristics
Sector -0.053 -0.075 -0.048 -0.047 -0.094 0.029 -0.074
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.033) (0.050)* (0.064) (0.068)
INIT PC x Sector -0.027 0.057 0.127 0.121 -0.306 -0.385 0.016
(0.229) (0.249) (0.197) (0.169) (0.205) (0.174)** (0.388)
PC Duration x Sector 0.034 -0.054 -0.004 -0.061 0.144 0.094 -0.043
(0.106) (0.071) (0.064) (0.059) (0.114) (0.102) (0.054)
PC Duration2 x Sector -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
LL -1214.274 -1213.201 -1214.882 -1212.531 -1213.387 -1214.405 -1214.753
No. of ﬁrms in sector i 171 137 139 507 129 125 70
Observations 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466 2466
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at (*) 10%, at (**) 5%, at (***) 1%
24Table 9: Probability of success in post-conﬂict (2), marginal eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Project characteristics
Duration -0.028 -0.030 -0.027 -0.017 -0.028 -0.077
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)** (0.009)*** (0.020)***
Investment=1 0.097 0.074 0.101 0.087 0.099 0.310
(0.049)** (0.058) (0.049)** (0.056) (0.048)** (0.091)***
IDA=1 0.117 0.138 0.118 0.072 0.120 0.151
(0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.028)** (0.036)*** (0.077)*
Preparation (1-4) 0.385 0.390 0.357 0.261 0.383 0.938
(0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.032)*** (0.068)***
Supervision (1-4) 0.478 0.468 0.480 0.293 0.467 0.980
(0.031)*** (0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.024)*** (0.034)*** (0.052)***
Environment characteristics
GDP Growth, (t-3;t) 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.008 0.012
(0.003)*** (0.005)* (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)**
Ln GDP per cap, (t-3;t) 0.064 0.044 0.071 0.039 0.069 0.100
(0.021)*** (0.021)* (0.022)*** (0.019)** (0.022)*** (0.047)**
Ln population, (t-3;t) 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.010





Fuel exports ratio, (t-3;t) -0.001
(0.001)
Conﬂict history
INIT PC -0.559 -0.462 -0.664 -0.468
(0.306)* (0.221)** (0.097)*** (0.467)
RETURN WAR 0.065 0.045
(0.090) (0.127)
PC Duration 0.075 0.087 0.228 0.136
(0.237) (0.050)* (0.096)** (0.130)
PC Duration
2 -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.010
(0.014) (0.004) (0.008)* (0.008)
INIT PC x Preparation 0.278
(0.200)
PC Duration x Preparation -0.034
(0.077)
PC Duration
2 x Preparation 0.002
(0.005)
INIT PC x Supervision 0.164 0.378 0.280
(0.047)*** (0.106)*** (0.152)*
PC Duration x Supervision -0.046 -0.089 -0.087
(0.018)** (0.031)*** (0.043)**
PC Duration







Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R
2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.21
ll -1202.024 -937.31 -1197.121 -705.238 -1197.007 -2817.873
Observations 2464 1918 2464 1828 2464 2467
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at (*) 10%, at (**) 5%, at (***) 1%
25Table 10: Probability of success in post-conﬂict, marginal eﬀects by outcome after ordered probit
Success=0 Success=1 Success=2 Success=3 Success=4 Success=5
Project characteristics
Duration 0.000 0.015 0.006 0.009 -0.026 -0.004
(0.000)** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)***
Investment=1 -0.002 -0.065 -0.022 -0.028 0.105 0.012
(0.001) (0.027)** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.039)*** (0.004)***
IDA=1 -0.001 -0.046 -0.018 -0.030 0.083 0.013
(0.000)** (0.012)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.023)*** (0.004)***
Preparation (1-4) -0.004 -0.203 -0.078 -0.124 0.359 0.050
(0.001)*** (0.019)*** (0.010)*** (0.014)*** (0.030)*** (0.007)***
Supervision (1-4) -0.004 -0.198 -0.077 -0.121 0.351 0.049
(0.001)*** (0.015)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.023)*** (0.006)***
Environment characteristics
GDP Growth, (t-3;t) -0.000 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 0.013 0.002
(0.000)** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)***
Ln GDP per cap, (t-3;t) -0.001 -0.025 -0.010 -0.016 0.045 0.006
(0.000)** (0.009)*** (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.017)*** (0.002)***
Ln population, (t-3;t) -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.001
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.001)
ICRG, (t-3;t) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Pseudo R
2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
ll -2047.31 -2047.31 -2047.31 -2047.31 -2047.31 -2047.31
Observations 1830 1830 1830 1830 1830 1830
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at (*) 10%, at (**) 5%, at (***) 1%
26